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SPECIAL EDUCATION/CIVIL PROCEDURE-THE IDEA OF
FAIRNESS: ALLOWING PARENT-ATTORNEYS TO RECOVER THEIR
ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT
INTRODUCTION
One of a parent's most important obligations is to educate her
child. This obligation becomes significantly more difficult when the
child is disabled. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) was enacted to help parents of disabled children ensure the
best possible education for their children.! Yet, the IDEA is a maze
of administrative processes, and unfortunately most parents do not
have the benefit of understanding the required procedures for
working with the local school system. Although an experienced at
torney could easily navigate the process for her client, unrepre
sented parents often cannot attain the best education available for
their children. When the parent is also an attorney, the rare possi
bility exists that the parent-attorney may be able to adequately ad
vocate for her child. However, even if a parent-attorney obtains a
successful result in litigating the IDEA claim, it is unlikely that he
will be compensated for the time and effort expended. 2
The current version of the IDEA contains a fee-shifting provi
sion, which reads: "In any action or proceeding brought under this
section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys'
fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability

1. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-45 (2000» [hereinafter Edu
cation for All Children Act]. This Act was the predecessor to the modern-day IDEA.
2. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006); S.N.
v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.
Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir.
1998); Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1993); Miller v. W. Lafayette
Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 1996). Each of these cases denied parent-attor
neys the right to recover their reasonable attorneys' fees under the IDEA's fee-shifting
provision. The reasoning behind these decisions, which varies considerably, is discussed
infra, Part II.A.
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who is the prevailing party."3 Several questions have arisen sur
rounding the interpretation of the fee-shifting provision. 4
One of these issues, and the one that is the focus of this Note,
occurs when a parent, who is also a member of the bar, represents
her disabled child, yet is unable to recover attorneys' fees under the
IDEA's fee-shifting provision. s This Note concludes that parent
attorneys who represent their children in IDEA cases should be
able to recover attorneys' fees because the plain language, legisla
tive history, and overall purpose of the IDEA support recovery,
and that the past decisions denying awards were erroneous.
In Part I, this Note will examine the history of the IDEA, from
the adoption of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(EAHCA), to the Handicapped Children's Protection Act (HCPA),
and the modern-day IDEA.6 Part I will also examine the Supreme
Court's decision in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources,7 and the ad
ministrative process of the modern-day IDEA.
Part II will discuss how courts have dealt with the fee-shifting
provision for parent-attorneys when faced with the issue. Part III
will discuss the rights given to parents under the IDEA, including
the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of those rights in Winkel
man v. Parma City School District. 8 Part III also examines whether
3. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
4. There are many problems that have surfaced surrounding 20 U.S.c.
§ 1415(i)(3)(B). See .Kathryn H. Crary, Comment, Necessary Expertise: Allowing Par
ents to Recover Expert Witness Fees Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 967, 969 (2004) (discussing whether the language of the IDEA
allows parents to recover the costs associated with their expert witnesses); Keith Grei
ner, Comment, Judicial Imprimatur Required: Raising the Standard for Awards of Attor
neys' Fees under the IDEA in Smith v. Fitchburg Public Schools, 41 NEW. ENG. L. REV.
711, 712-13 (2001) (arguing that the Court's decision in Buckhannon Board and Care
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598
(2001), will have a chilling effect on IDEA litigation).
5. See Ford, 461 F.3d at 1091; S.N., 448 F.3d at 605; Woodside, 248 F.3d at 131;
Doe, 165 F.3d at 264-65; Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 612; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 906-07.
6. EAHCA was enacted first in 1975 in order to give handicapped children an
education that would adequately prepare them for some form of post-graduation em
ployment through the use of a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) and an
Individual Education Plan (IEP). Education for All Children Act, supra note 1. The
EAHCA was amended by the HCPA in 1986. See Handicapped Children's Protection
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-45). Those statutes were amended several times and are now codified at 20
U.S.c. §§ 1400-45. They now comprise the modern-day IDEA.
7. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598.
8. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007).
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parent-attorneys are proceeding pro se when representing their dis
abled children in an IDEA action, a theory some courts have relied
on when denying attorneys' fees to parent-attorneys.9 Part III will
then go on to analyze the plain language and legislative history of
the IDEA's fee-shifting provision to determine how it should be
interpreted.
Finally, this Note will conclude that because parent-attorneys
are not proceeding pro se, awarding attorneys' fees in this context
does not implicate the same concerns that surround the question of
attorneys' fees in pro se representation. Moreover, the plain lan
guage of the IDEA's fee-shifting provision-as well as the legisla
tive history and overall purpose of the statute-mandate that
parent-attorneys who successfully represent their children recover
their reasonable attorneys' fees.
I.
A.

AN

OVERVIEW OF THE

IDEA

The EAHCA: The Foundation for the IDEA

Throughout much of the history of the United States, disabled
children were denied the opportunity to receive an education equal
to that of nondisabled children.l° Until the mid-twentieth century,
disabled children were often ostracized, considered feebleminded,
and "categorically excluded from public schools."ll Not until the
1960s did attitudes toward both the mentally and physically dis
abled transform.l 2 In 1975, Congress recognized that millions of
disabled children across the country were not receiving an educa
tion due to their exclusion from the public school systems,B and it
enacted the EAHCA.14 The EAHCA's stated purpose was to en
sure that "all handicapped children have available to them . . . a
9. See, e.g., Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 612; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 906-07.
10. Greiner, supra note 4, at 713-14.
11. Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 462
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring».
12. There is some suggestion that other contemporaneous social trends, namely
the public recognition of disabled World War II veterans and the civil rights movement,
contributed to this shift in attitude toward the disabled. Id. at 714. Greiner explains
that due to the number of wounded soldiers who returned home from World War II, the
country was forced to confront these disabilities both socially and medically. Id. Fur
ther, the civil rights movement advocated classroom integration of mentally and physi
cally disabled children. Id. See generally RICHARD F. DAUGHERTY, SPECIAL
EDUCATION: A SUMMARY OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, TERMS, AND TRENDS (2001).
13. 20 U.S.c. § 1400(c)(2)(B) (2000).
14. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-45).
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free appropriate public education ... designed to meet their unique
needs ...."15 This cornerstone of the EAHCA would evolve and
become engrained in the modern-day IDEA.16
As part of the EAHCA, parents were allowed to question the
education provided to their disabled child. by the school district and
ultimately had the right to an impartial due process hearing to de
termine whether that education was indeed appropriateP How
ever, because the original EAHCA had no fee-shifting provision
built into it, parents who did not have financial resources were
faced with tough choices regarding legal representation. 18 As a re
sult, parents seeking to recover their attorneys' fees had to do so by
bringing an action pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act,19 or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.20 Some parents
successfully recovered under this scheme21 until 1984 when the Su
preme Court decided Smith v. Robinson. 22
B.

Smith v. Robinson and Congress's Response

In 1984, the Supreme Court heard a case from Rhode Island
concerning Congress's intent in enacting the EAHCA, specifically
15. Id. § 3 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. § 1400(d)(1)(A)).
16. S. REP. No. 94-455, at 29 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1480, 1482.
17. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1), 1415(f)(1).
18. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.
19. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat.
2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (2000)).
20. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.c. § 794 (2000)); see also Crary, supra note 4, at 973 n.57 (noting
that the intention of Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
was to give courts the ability to assist plaintiffs whose constitutional and statutory rights
had been violated). This Comment has an excellent discussion of the situation and how
parents dealt with it:
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prevents discrimination on the
basis of handicap in a variety of programs and activities receiving federal fi
nancial assistance, and section 505(b) of this Act provides attorneys' fees for
successful plaintiffs in these claims. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Robinson, parents had frequently brought claims under both the EAHCA and
either section 1988 or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, ostensibly to ob
tain an award of attorney's fees.
Id. (citations omitted). The real problem was that in order to recover their fees, parents
had to bring suit under multiple statutes, which raised the cost and complexity of litiga
tion. Id.
21. See, e.g., Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823, 823 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming decision
of district court awarding parents their attorney's fees based on a Rehabilitation Act of
1973 claim), overruled by Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
22. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), superseded by statute, Handicapped
Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.c. §§ 1440-45).
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whether the proper method for obtaining attorneys' fees was via the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act or under section 505 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.23 Smith arose out of an action to
determine whether an eight-year old child afflicted with cerebral
palsy could demand that the local school district, or the state Divi
sion of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, pay for her edu
cation at a private school.24 The child's parents prevailed in their
action in the lower court and brought a request for attorney's fees
pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.25 The
U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island awarded attor
ney's fees to the parents for a variety of reasons,26 but the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. 27 The parents appealed, and
the Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit. 28 The Court rea
23.
24.

25.

Smith, 468 U.S. at 994-95.
Id. at 995.
Id. at 1000.
Id. at 1001. In Smith, the Court summarized the reasoning of the District

26.
Court:
[T]he court reasoned that because petitioners were required to exhaust their
EHA [Education of the Handicapped Act] remedies before bringing their
§ 1983 and § 504 claims, they were entitled to fees for those procedures ....
[T]he court rejected the defendants' argument that fees should not be allowed
because this was an action under the EHA, which does not provide for fees.
In the court's view, respondents had given insufficient weight to the fact that
petitioners had alleged equal protection and § 1983 claims as well as the EHA
claim. The court added that it found the equal protection claim petitioners
included in their second amended complaint to be colorable and nonfrivolous.
Petitioners thus were entitled to fees for prevailing in an action to enforce
their § 1983 claim.
Id. at 1001-02.
27. Id. at 1002. The Smith court described the First Circuit's reason for denying
fees, stating:
The court first noted that, under what is labeled the "American Rule," attor
neys' fees are available as a general matter only when statutory authority so
provides. Here the action and relief granted in this case fell within the reach
of the EHA, a federal statute that establishes a comprehensive federal-state
scheme for the provision of special education to handicapped children, but
that does not provide for attorneys' fees. For fees, the District Court had to
look to § 1988 and § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act.
As to the § 1988 claim, the court acknowledged the general rule that
when the claim upon which a plaintiff actually prevails is accompanied by a
"substantial," though undecided, § 1983 claim arising from the same nucleus
of facts, a fee award is appropriate. Here, petitioners' § 1983 claims arguably
were at least substantial enough to support federal jurisdiction. Even if the
§ 1983 claims were substantial, however, the Court of Appeals concluded that,
given the comprehensiveness of the EHA, Congress could not have intended
its omission of attorneys' fees relief to be rectified by recourse to § 1988.
Id. at 1002-03 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
28. Id. at 1021.
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soned that allowing parents to circumvent the administrative pro
cess of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) would be
contrary to Congress's objectives in enacting the statute. 29 The
Court further stated that since Congress had provided that the
EHA be the exclusive avenue for disabled children challenging
their education, parents could not recover attorneys' fees based on
the EHA or other civil rights statutes. 30
Congress's response to the Court's decision in Smith was both
swift and hostile. It enacted HCPA in 1986,31 including the follow
ing provision: "In any action or proceeding brought under this sub
section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys'
fees as part of the costs to the parents or guardian of a handicapped
child or youth who is the prevailing party."32 With this language,
parents could now obtain fee awards if they were prevailing party.33
C.

The 1997 Reauthorization of the IDEA to the Present Day

In 1997, Congress reauthorized the IDEA,34 expanding the Act
to increase the accountability of local schools, broaden the legal
protections and remedies available to disabled children, and in
crease the parents' rights with regard to the educational decision
making process. 35
Congress also limited eligibility for awards of attorneys' fees. 36
The first limitation made fee recovery unavailable for "attorney
29. Id. at 1012-13; see also Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. § 1400).
30. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012.
31. Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 20 U.S.c. § 141S(i)(3)(B)
(2000»; see also S. REP. No. 99-112, at 2 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798,
1799 ("Congress' original intent was that due process procedures, including the right to
litigation if that became necessary, be available to all parents.").
32. Handicapped Children's Protection Act § 2(B).
33. However, problems would surface in attempting to define who is a prevailing
party. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (mUddying the waters in attempting to define who is a "pre
vailing party" for the purpose of recovering attorneys' fees).
34. Congress officially began calling the IDEA by that name when it amended
the EAHCA in 1991. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-119, § 1, 105 Stat. 587,587 (codified at 20 U.S.c. § 1400). For the
purposes of this Note, the essential provisions of the IDEA have not changed.
35. Jessica Butler-Arkow, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improve
ment Act of 2004: Shifting School Districts' Attorneys' Fees to Parents of Children with
Disabilities and Counsel, 42 WILLAMElTE L. REV. 527, 529 (2006); see also Judith E.
Heumann & Tom Hehir, Believing in Children-A Great IDEA for the Future, EXCEP·
TIONAL PARENT, Sept. 1997, http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSERSIP0IicyIIDEAlarticle2.
html (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
36. See 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(D)-(F).

2009]

THE IDEA OF FAIRNESS

209

presence at team meetings to develop a student's Individual Educa
tion Plan (IEP)" and "mediations prior to a due process complaint
being filed."3? The second limitation made fees unavailable when
the parent "[did] not provide[] the school district with the informa
tion required in the due process complaint. "38 These amendments,
when combined with the 2004 reauthorization, comprise the mod
ern-day exceptions to obtaining a fee award under the IDEA.39
Further, § 1415(i)(3)(E) provides an exception to the limita
tions on attorneys' fees, stating: "Notwithstanding subparagraph
(D), an award of attorneys' fees and related costs may be made to a
parent who is the prevailing party and who was substantially justi
fied in rejecting the settlement offer."40 While altering the lan
guage of the IDEA's fee-shifting provision clarified Congress's
intent to create a mechanism for parents to recover attorneys' fees,
37. Lynn M. Daggett, Special Education Attorney's Fees: of Buckhannon, the
IDEA Reauthorization Bills, and the IDEA as Civil Rights Statute, 8 U.C DAVIS J. JUV.
L. & POL'y 1, 9 (2004).
38. /d. The original text of the bill contained another proposed limitation requir
ing courts "to take into consideration what impact that award will have on all of the
students in the district or in the particular classrooms," which was defeated in the Sen
ate. Id.
39. 20 U.S.CA. § 141S(i)(3)(D) (Supp. 2008). The statute reads:
(i) In general
Attorneys' fees may not be awarded and related costs may not be reim
bursed in any action or proceeding under this section for services performed
subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent if
(I) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the case of an administrative proceed
ing, at any time more than 10 days before the proceeding begins;
(II) the offer is not accepted within 10 days; and
(III) the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief
finally obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the
offer of settlement.
(ii) IEP Team meetings
Attorneys' fees may not be awarded relating to any meeting of the IEP
Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative pro
ceeding or judicial action, or, at the discretion of the State, for a mediation
described in subsection (e) of this section.
(iii) Opportunity to resolve complaints
A meeting conducted pursuant to subsection (f)(l)(B)(i) of this section shall
not be considered
(I) a meeting convened as a result of an administrative hearing or
judicial action; or
(II) an administrative hearing or judicial action for purposes of this
paragraph.
Id.
40. 20 U.S.C § 141S(i)(3)(E).
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these amendments did not end the controversy surrounding fee
shifting under the IDEA.
In 2001, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Buckhannon
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health
and Human Resources. 41 In Buckhannon, the Court interpreted
the fee-shifting provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act42
and the Fair Housing Amendments Act,43 statutes that have fee
shifting provisions closely akin to those in the Civil Rights Act 44
and the IDEA.45 In Buckhannon, the Court held that to be
deemed a "prevailing party" under the fee-shifting provision, the
party attempting to obtain a fee award must have acquired a "judi
cially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties."46
Thus, in order to qualify for a fee award, the parents had to obtain
some form of court-ordered relief, either by judgment or court-ap
proved consent decree. 47 In its holding, the Court overturned the
long-accepted catalyst theory of obtaining prevailing party status. 48
The Court took a textual approach in interpreting the IDEA,49 rea
soning that the common legal definition of "prevail" was plain on
41. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
42. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 505, 104 Stat.
327, 371 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000».
43. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 812,102 Stat.
1619, 1633 (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 36012).
44. 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b).
45. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(8); see also Daggett, supra note 37, at 35 n.186.
Since the Buckhannon decision, three federal courts of appeal have found that the deci
sion applies to IDEA claims. See T.D. v. Lagrange Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 469 (7th Cir.
2003); John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 552 (3d Cir. 2003); J.c.
v. Reg'l Sch. Dist., 278 F.3d 119, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2002).
46. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
47. Daggett, supra note 37, at 29.
48. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602. The catalyst theory "posited that a plaintiff is a
'prevailing party' if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a
voluntary change in the defendant's conduct." Id. at 601. The Court also recognized
that a host of federal appellate courts (all but the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits) had upheld the catalyst theory. Id. at 602; see Stanton v. S. Berkshire
Reg'l Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574 (1st Cir. 1999); Morris v. W. Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203
(11th Cir. 1999); Payne v. Bd. of Educ., 88 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 1996); Marbley v. Bane, 57
F.3d 224 (2nd Cir. 1995); Kilgour v. Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 1995); Zinn v.
Shalala, 35 F.3d 273 (7th Cir. 1994); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1994); Baum
gartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541 (3d Cir. 1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v.
Pulaski City Special Sch. Dist., 17 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1994).
49. Daggett, supra note 37, at 30. The textual approach argues that judges should
go no further than the specific language of the statute when making decisions concern
ing the statute. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 25-26 (2006).
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its face. 50 The Court appeared not to consider the policy implica
tions that would follow from its decision.
Most courts have agreed that the Buckhannon decision should
apply to the IDEA.51 However, Buckhannon has drawn scholarly
criticism from many places. 52 The consequences of applying Buck
hannon to the IDEA were pointed out by Justice Ginsburg in her
dissent, where she claimed that the Court's limited definition of
"prevailing party" would provide private attorneys less incentive to
prosecute IDEA cases in the future. 53 While Buckhannon provides
a significant barrier for some parents wishing to recover their attor
neys' fees, the complexity of the IDEA's administrative process evi
dences the necessity of parents being able to obtain and afford
experienced counsel in order to further the IDEA's objectives.
D.

The Administrative Process of an IDEA Claim

This section of Part I will examine exactly how IDEA claims
are adjudicated. Under the IDEA, states that receive federal fund
50. Black's Law Dictionary defines "prevail" for this purpose as: "To obtain the
relief sought in an action; to win a lawsuit." BLACK'S LAW DICfIONARY 1226 (8th ed.
2004).
51. Daggett, supra note 37, at 35; see also Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 264 F. Supp.
2d 65, 69-73 (D. Mass. 2003); Matthew V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d
1331,1340-44 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Alegria v. District of Columbia, No. 02-7126, 2002 WL
31818925 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13,2002); Luis R. v. Joliet Twp. High Sch. Dist. 204, No. Ol-C
4798, 2002 WL 54544, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2002); supra note 46 for federal courts of
appeal that have held that Buckhannon applies to the IDEA's fee-shifting provision.
52. See Paolo G. Annino, The Buckhannon Decision: The End of the Catalyst
Theory and a Setback to Civil Rights, 26 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11,
13 (2002) (arguing that Buckhannon "discourages the enforcement of Civil Rights");
Daggett, supra note 37, at 52-53 (arguing that the future of the IDEA's fee-shifting
provision is unclear due to Buckhannon); Michael Giuseppe Congiu, Comment, An
End to Empty Distinctions: Fee Shifting, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
and Doe v. Boston Public Schools, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 979 (2005) (arguing that
Doe v. Boston Public Schools, a decision which relied on Buckhannon, should be over
turned); Greiner, supra note 4, at 755-56 (arguing that attorneys' fee awards are neces
sary.for the proper function of the IDEA and urging congressional action to clear up
the "prevailing party" controversy); Robert H. Greenwood, Attorney Fees in Special
Education Cases, N.J. LAW., June 2003, at 56, 59-60 (noting the comments of New
Jersey special education lawyer Ruth Lowenkron, which suggest that Buckhannon has
disadvantaged the poor by raising the bar too high to recover fees under the IDEA).
But see id. at 60 (relating the comments of New Jersey lawyer and long-time child advo
cate Ira Fingles, which suggest that Buckhannon has had no significant impact).
53. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Although Buck
hannon is not the specific issue of this Note, understanding its context is essential be
cause it has been used to bar awards to parent-attorneys even where such awards
should have been allowed under the language of the statute. See Matthew V. v. Dekalb
County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
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ing must provide the federal government with an annual plan to
offer special education and to meet, generally, the statute's free ap
propriate public education (FAPE) standard. 54 In addition to pro
viding a FAPE, schools must involve the parents of the disabled
child in the determination of what the educational process should
be55 and notify the parents of their procedural rights under the stat
ute. 56 The normal process of administering the IDEA, assuming
that there are not any quarrels between the parents and the school,
involves ten steps:
1) a child is identified as possibly needing special education and
related services; 2) the child is evaluated; 3) eligibility is decided;
4) the child is found eligible for services; 5) an Individualized Ed
ucation Program (IEP) meeting is scheduled; 6) an IEP meeting
is held, and the IEP is written; 7) services are provided; 8) pro
gress is measured and reported to parents; 9) the IEP is reviewed
by the IEP team a minimum of once a year; and 10) the child is
reevaluated at least every three years.57

Whether a child is eligible under the IDEA requires an evalua
tion, which can be ordered by a hearing officer, obtained with pa
rental consent, or requested by a parent. 58 Once a child has been
deemed eligible under the statute, the school works with the child's
parents to create an IEP, which describes the educational services
to be provided to the child throughout the school year. 59 If at any
point a parent disputes the IEP, the results of an evaluation, or the
way that the IEP is being administered, the parent can request an
impartial due process hearing. 60
At the due process hearing, the parents have the right to re
present their child themselves, to have an attorney present, or to
54. M. Brendhan Flynn, Note, In Defense of Maroni: Why Parents Should be Al
lowed to Proceed Pro Se in IDEA Cases, 80 IND. L.J. 881, 884 (2005); see also 20 U.S.c.
§ 1412(a)(I) (2000).
55. Flynn, supra note 54, at 885.
56. See 20 U.S.c. § 1415(b)(3) (requiring written notice to the parents); id.
§ 1415(c) (detailing what the notice must include).
57. Tana Lin, Commentary, Recovering Attorney's Fees Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 180 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (2003) (citing OFFICE OF SPECIAL
EDUC. & REHABILITATIVE SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., A GUIDE TO THE INDIVIDU.
ALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM (2000), available at http://www.ed.gov/parents/needs/
speced/iepguide/iepguide.pdf).
58. See 20 V.S.c. § 1414(a)-(c); Flynn, supra note 54, at 885.
59. 20 U.S.c. § 1414(d)(I)(A); Flynn, supra note 54, at 885.
60. Id. § 1415(f).

2009]

THE IDEA OF FAIRNESS

213

use a non-attorney representative to represent their child. 61 In or
der to prevail at a due process hearing, the parents must prove one
of two things: either that the school failed to meet the IDEA's stan
dard for an IEP, or that the school did not follow the statute's pro
cedural safeguards. 62 If the parents are not satisfied with the results
of the due process hearing, they may appeal to the state educational
board's appellate review pane1. 63 If the results are still not satisfac
tory and all avenues of the administrative hearing process have
been exhausted, then either party, the school district or the parents,
can appeal to a state or federal district court. 64
The final stage of the process is the court's review of the ad
ministrative hearings. Courts will usually review due process hear
ings under a limited standard and scope, giving due weight to the
outcome of the administrative proceedings.65 This deference recog
nizes that local hearing officers are usually experts in their respec
tive fields, and that administration of education is traditionally a
state function. 66
II.
A.

THE IDEA's FEE-SHIFTING PROVISION AS IT PERTAINS
TO PARENT-ATTORNEYS

The Role of Kay v. Ehrler

The first step in understanding the decisions involving the
IDEA's fee-shifting provision as it applies to parent-attorneys is to
examine the Supreme Court's decision in Kay v. Ehrler. 67 Though
not an IDEA case, Kay is of paramount importance to the legal
reasoning of the cases that have been decided regarding the IDEA
61. Id. § 1415(h)(1). The due process hearing is usually conducted by a state offi
cial. Id. § 1415(f)(1).
62. Flynn, supra note 54, at 885. Under this standard the IEP must provide a
FAPE. See 20 U.S.c. § 1402(a)(1). The statute also requires that disabled children be
given an education that will offer them meaningful opportunities for post-graduation
employment. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g).
64. ld. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
65. See Flynn, supra note 54, at 886; see also Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d
1045, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a court should give weight to the results of
the administrative proceedings); Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d 773,
790 (1st Cir. 1984), affd, 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (stating that courts must use the adminis
trative record unless there is new evidence to supplement the record). But see Metro.
Gov't of Nashville v. Cook, 915 F.2d 232, 234 (6th Cir. 1990) (allowing any new evi
dence to be presented to the court).
66. Flynn, supra note 54, at 886-87 (citing Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1052-53).
67. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991).
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fee-shifting provision. 68 In Kay, a civil rights action, the Court held
that a pro se litigant, who was also a lawyer, could not be awarded
his attorney's fees under the fee-shifting provision of the Civil
Rights ACt. 69 The fee-shifting language of § 1988 stated, "In any
action or proceeding ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attor
ney's fee as part of the costs .... "70 The Court decided that the
language of the statute was not clear. 71 It thus turned to the House
and Senate Reports for clarification of the underlying statutory pur
poseJ2 The Court concluded that the legislature had focused on
the need for lawyers to be affordable to the general public,73 and
the primary statutory concern was to enable civil rights litigants to
obtain independent counsel.74 Finally, the Court held that a rule
that would award fees to attorneys who represent themselves pro se
in § 1988 claims would undermine the stated purpose of the statute
by discouraging litigants from obtaining independent counsel:
A rule that authorizes awards of counsel fees to pro se litigants
even if limited to those who are members of the bar-would cre
ate a disincentive to employ counsel whenever such a plaintiff
considered himself competent to litigate on his own behalf. The
statutory policy of furthering the successful prosecution of meri
torious claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive
to retain counsel in every such case. 75
68. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist, 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006); S.N.
v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.
Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir.
1998); Matthew V. v. Dekalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2003);
Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1993); Miller v. W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch.
Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 1996).
69. Kay, 499 U.S. at 438.
70. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b) (2000).
71. Kay, 499 U.S. at 435. The Court explained the statute's lack of clarity:
On the one hand, petitioner is an "attorney," and has obviously handled his
professional responsibilities in this case in a competent manner. On the other
hand, the word "attorney" assumes an agency relationship and it seems likely
that Congress contemplated an attorney-client relationship as the predicate
for an award under § 1988. Although this section was no doubt intended to
encourage litigation protecting civil rights, it is also true that its more specific
purpose was to enable potential plaintiffs to obtain the assistance of compe
tent counsel in vindicating their rights.
[d. at 435-36 (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 436 n.8.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 438.
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Later courts would turn to this Supreme Court statement for
guidance in attempting to resolve issues with the IDEA's fee-shift
ing provision. 76
B.

The Early Decisions Involving the IDEA's Fee-Shifting
Provision

The first court to tackle the IDEA fee-shifting provision as it
pertains to parent-attorneys was the U.S. District Court for the Dis
trict of Maryland in Rappaport v. Vance,77 In Rappaport, an attor
ney-father brought a claim on behalf of his disabled minor child,
contesting certain elements of his child's IEP,78 The father, having
obtained a favorable judgment in the IDEA claim, claimed to be a
prevailing party entitled to his reasonable attorney's fees under the
IDEA's fee-shifting provision,79
The court began by stating that both the legislative history of
the IDEA, as well as existing case law interpreting the IDEA's fee
shifting provision, indicate that it should be interpreted consistently
with Title VII's fee-shifting provision. 80 The court then examined
the legal relationship between Mr. Rappaport and his disabled child
to determine whether he was proceeding pro se. It observed that:
"Because the language of the statute identifies the parent with the
child, and because of the' close, natural relationship between parent
and child, a parent's representation of a disabled child is effectively
pro se representation."81 The court then concluded that because
Mr. Rappaport was acting pro se, and because the IDEA's fee-shift
ing provision should be interpreted in accord with Title VII's provi
sion, the logic of Kay applied, and the petition for attorney's fees
was denied. 82
76. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir.
2006); S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v.
Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ.,
165 F.3d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1998); Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 611-12 (D. Md.
1993); Miller v. W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905, 906-07 (Ind. 1996).
77. Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. 609.
78. Id. at 610.
79. Id. at 610-11.
80. Id. at 611. The court cited a Senate report and the decision in Abu-Sahyun v.
Palo Alto Unified School District as justification for interpreting the IDEA's fee-shift
ing provision in accord with that of Title VII. Abu-Sahyun v. Palo Alto Unified Sch.
Dist., 843 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 1988); S. REp. No. 99-112, at 14 (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1978, 1804.
81. Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 612.
82. Id. at 611-12. The court expounded on its application of Kay's reasoning:
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The next court to examine this issue was the Supreme Court of
Indiana in Miller v. West Lafayette Community School Corp.83 As
in Rappaport, the parents were challenging their disabled child's
IEP on the grounds that it did not meet his educational needs.84
The father, an attorney, brought the claim on behalf of his son. 85
Miller did not analyze the question of whether Mr. Miller was act
ing pro se, but merely agreed with the trial court that he was. 86 The
Miller court then pointed out the similarities between the fee-shift
ing provisions of the IDEA and 42 U.S.c. § 1988. 87 The court ap
plied the reasoning of Kay, agreeing with the result reached in
Rappaport, and denied the plaintiffs' petition for a fee award. 88
C.

The Federal Appellate Courts Deny Fee Awards

In 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided
Doe v. Board of Education. 89 This was the first time that a federal
appellate court heard the issue whether parent-attorneys could re
cover their fees. 90 The Does challenged the school district's treat
ment of their disabled son· and were represented by Mr. Doe, an
attorney, who brought the claim on behalf of his child.91 Namely,
they asserted that the school district was not providing an appropri
ate behavior modification program.92 The Does prevailed at an ap
pellate hearing before the Maryland Office of Administrative
Hearings and ultimately petitioned the district court for their attorIt should also be noted that attorneys' fee awards in general provide litigants

with access to legal expertise they would not normally have. Since Nolan Rap
paport is a lawyer, such a provision is not as critical. Thus, for the same rea
sons that pro se litigants' attorneys' fees are denied in Title VII cases, such
fees should be denied in IDEA disputes.
Id. at 611. When the court says "for the same reasons" it is referring to the logic of
Kay. The statement above echoes the Kay decision. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432
(1991).
83. Miller v. W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 1996).
84. Id. at 905-06.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 906.
Id. at 906-07. The court noted the similarity between Miller and Rappaport

and stated, "[w]hile the rulings of a United States District Court are not binding upon
this Court, we agree with the reasoning in Rappaport and reach a similar result in the
present case." Id.
89. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998).
90. Id. at 262 ("No circuit, however, has dealt with a Kay-based challenge to fees
for services of an attorney in successfully representing his or her own child in an IDEA
claim.").
91. Id. at 261.
92.

Id.
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ney's fees under what was then the fee-shifting provision: 20 U.S.c.
§ 1415(e)(4)(B).93 The Does argued that the plain language of the
statute provided for a fee award, but the Fourth Circuit ruled
against them: 94
The Doe court disagreed with the Rappaport and Miller courts
that parent-attorneys who represent their children are acting pro
se.95 However, the Doe court still found Kay to be applicable. 96
The court concluded that Mr. Doe had "obtained an excellent re
sult"97 in representing his child and that parent-attorneys were not
acting pro se. Yet, the court denied an attorney fee to the Does,
basing its reasoning on the "special circumstances doctrine."98 The
Doe court stated that the special circumstances doctrine was appli
cable in a situation where, "although a prevailing party should ordi
narily recover an attorney's fee, special circumstances can render
93. Id. In 1997, prior to the Court hearing the Does' claim, the IDEA
reauthorization amended the fee-shifting language, which altered the codification from
20 U.S.c. § 1415(e)(4)(B) to 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(F). See supra note 37 and ac
companying text.
94. Doe, 165 F.3d at 265.
95. Id. at 262-63. The court reasoned that, in an IDEA claim, the real party in
interest is the child:
The adequacy of such a plan is determined by how appropriateiy it meets the
needs of the child, not the parents. Even the wording of the IDEA fee-shifting
provision supports the notion that the child is the focus of the IDEA, by pro
viding fees "to the parents of a child or youth with a disability who is the pre
vailing party. "
Though parents have some rights under the IDEA, the child, not the par
ents, is the real party in interest in any IDEA proceeding. The references to
parents are best understood as accommodations to the fact of the child's inca
pacity. That incapacity does not collapse the identity of the child into that of
his parents.
Id. (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 263. The court stated that although Kay was not directly on point, it
had clear relevance in this situation:
After all, the central thrust of Kay is that fee-shifting statutes are meant to
encourage the effective prosecution of meritorious claims, and that they seek
to achieve this purpose by encouraging parties to obtain independent repre
sentation. Like attorneys appearing pro se, attorney-parents are generally in
capable of exercising sufficient independent judgment on behalf of their
children to ensure that "reason, rather than emotion" will dictate the conduct
of the litigation.
Id. (citing Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437 (1991».
97. Id.
98. Id. at 264. The special circumstances doctrine was announced in Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968), and affirmed in Hensley v. Eck
erhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983), two cases dealing with the fee-shifting provisions of
civil rights statutes. The special circumstances doctrine is applied when a party is a
prevailing party for purposes of a statutory fee recovery, but special circumstances war
rant a denial of the award. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429.
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such an award unjust."99 The court held that the special circum
stance here was the fact that the disabled child was represented by
his parent and not an independent attorney and denied the Does
their attorney's fees. 1OO
In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit examined
the same issue that was addressed in Doe in Woodside v. School
District of Philadelphia Board of Education. 101 Mr. Woodside, a li
censed attorney, brought an administrative challenge on behalf of
his child against the school board on the grounds that his disabled
son's physical and occupational therapy sessions did not meet his
needs. 102 After prevailing at an administrative hearing, the Wood
sides petitioned the district court for their attorney's fees under the
IDEA's fee-shifting statute. 103 The petition was denied, and the
Woodsides appealed. 104
The Woodside court took note of the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Doe .105 After acknowledging and summarizing Doe, the court
denied an award stating that it joined "the Fourth Circuit in holding
that an attorney-parent cannot receive attorney fees for work rep
resenting his minor child in proceedings under the IDEA."106 The
court offered no additional rationale for its decision. 107
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard S.N. v. Pitt
sford Central School District in 2006.108 S.N. dealt with an IDEA
claim based upon a challenge that the disabled student's IEP was
not meeting her needs.109 After prevailing at an administrative ap
peal, S.N., represented by her father, petitioned the district court
for attorney's fees, and appealed when that petition was denied. 110
The Second Circuit, noting the holdings of Woodside and Doe, de
nied the fee award based upon Kay.ll1
99. Doe, 165 F.3d at 264 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hensley,
461 U.S. at 429).
100. Id. at 264-65.
101. Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2001).
102. Id. at 130.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 130-31.
106. Id. at 131.
107. Id. at 129-31.
108. S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2006).
109. Id. at 602.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 603-05. Interestingly, the court never stated specifically whether par
ent-attorneys were in fact acting pro se. Nevertheless, it commented that "[w]e ac
knowledge that S.N.'s request [for fees] does not fall directly within the Supreme
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The most recent federal appellate court to examine the issue
and deny a fee award was the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir
cuit in Ford v. Long Beach Unified School District,112 Ford arose
out of yet another challenge to a disabled student's IEP; the child
was represented by her mother.1l3 After a settlement was reached
between the parties, Ford moved for attorney's fees. 114
Again, in denying fees, the court ultimately relied upon the
previous holdings of appellate courts and Kay,115 The court noted
that under the plain language of the statute, "the Fords appear to
be entitled to fees."116 Yet, despite the apparent plain meaning, the
court looked to familiar sources for assistance in interpreting the
statute's language-§ 1988 and the Kay decision. 117 The Ford court
agreed with Woodside and found that parent-attorneys are not act
ing pro se:
Like an attorney appearing pro se, a disabled child repre
sented by his or her parent does not benefit from the judgment of
an independent third party. Indeed, "the danger of inadequate
representation is as great when an emotionally charged parent
represents his minor child as when the parent represents
himself. "118

Although the court recognized that some parent-attorneys may
be able to provide rational, competent representation for their chil
dren, the court was "convinced" that a bright-line rule that parent
attorneys are unable to do so was more faithful to the legislative

Court's holding in Kay, but nonetheless agree with the Third and Fourth Circuits that
Kay is clearly relevant." Id. at 604. The court was not persuaded by the attorney
father's arguments distinguishing Kay. He asserted (1) that parent-attorneys were not
acting pro se and thus Kay did not apply; (2) there are differences between the statute
analyzed in Kay, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act, and the IDEA; and (3)
that if fees were denied, it could create arbitrary distinctions between IDEA fee claims
filed by parent-attorneys and more distant relative-attorneys. Id. at 604-05.
112. Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006).
113. Id. at 1088. The administrative history of the case is more complex than
stated. For those interested in a messy IDEA situation, this unusual chain of events and
disputes are summed up nicely by the court. See id. at 1088-89.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 1090.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1091 (quoting Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d

129, 131 (3d Cir. 2001».
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intent. 119 This bright line rule, of course, precluded the court from
awarding the Fords their attorney's fees. 12o
D.

The Lone Court to Authorize a Fee Award to a Parent
Attorney

The only court that has actually awarded fees to a parent-attor
ney is the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Geor
gia. Matthew V. v. Dekalb County School System involved a dispute
over an assistive technology evaluation made under the disabled
student's IEP,121 The plaintiff, represented by his mother, a Geor
gia attorney, prevailed at an administrative hearing, but the admin
istrative law judge did not believe that she had the authority to
grant an award of attorney's fees,122 The mother-attorney then pe
titioned the federal district court for an attorney's fee award under
§ 141S(i)(3)(B).123
The Matthew V. court began in a familiar spot, analyzing Kay
and its applicability to the situation. 124 After summarizing the ra
tionale of Kay, the court noted the decisions in Woodside and Doe,
paying special attention to the fact that those courts had found that
parent-attorneys who represent their disabled children in IDEA
claims do not act pro se,125 However, the court disagreed with the
result reached by the Woodside and Doe courts for four reasons:
119. Id. The court stated:
[O]n some occasions, attorney-parents will provide independent, reasoned
representation to their children. Given the underlying results, we can only
conclude that ... [the disabled child's mother] "obviously handled h[er] pro
fessional responsibilities in this case in a competent manner." Nevertheless,
we are convinced that our rule-which presumes irrefutably that parents and
guardians are always unable to provide independent, dispassionate legal ad
vice-will better serve Congress' intentions.
Id. (quoting Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991)). The court never specifically men
tioned what "Congress' intention" was, but noted that "awarding attorneys' fees to the
Fords would create a disincentive to employ counsel whenever a parent or guardian
considered herself competent to litigate on behalf of her child." Id. This seems to
suggest that the court interpreted Congress's intent to have been to create an incentive
for employment of independent, third-party counsel.
120. Id.
121. Matthew V. v. Dekalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1333 (N.D.
Ga. 2003). The disagreement centered on who would pay for an independent evalua
tion of Matthew's handwriting. When the school refused to pay for the evaluation,
Matthew's parents ultimately, after much correspondence with the school system, peti
tioned for a due process hearing. Id. at 1333-34.
122. /d. at 1334.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1335-36.
125. /d. at 1336-37. The court noted the following:
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First, nothing in the language of the statute or legislative history
prohibited a fee award in these circumstances. 126 Second, parents
and their disabled children are separate legal entities under the
IDEA, which satisfies the agency relationship mentioned in Kay.127
Third, the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct serve as a check
to any kind of attorney misconduct, like failure to adequately con
sider the risks of representing one's own child. 128 Finally, an eco
nomic analysis of the situation revealed that a parent-attorney may
very well be the best attorney available for the cost.1 29 The court
held that an attorney's fee award to a parent-attorney is permissible
based on "the text of the statute, its legislative history, and the dis
tinctions between the facts here and in Kay."130 Given the differ
ence in the reasoning between the courts that have decided this
issue, it is necessary to take a closer look at the reasoning of those
cases and how the IDEA's fee-shifting language should be
interpreted.
III.

WHY COURTS SHOULD GRANT PARENT-ATTORNEYS
THEIR ATTORNEYS' FEES

This section argues that parent-attorneys should be allowed to
recover their attorneys' fees. It will begin by examining the
problems with the reasoning of the court decisions denying fee
The [Fourth Circuit] first recognized that parents and children are distinct le
gal entities under the IDEA; thus, it rejected the notion that an attorney-par
ent's representation of his child in IDEA proceedings actually constitutes pro
se representation like in Kay . ... The Third Circuit acknowledged that a par
ent who represents his child under the IDEA does not act pro se; nevertheless,
the court agreed with the reasoning set forth in Kay and Doe.
[d. at 1336 (citations omitted).
126. [d. at 1337.
127.
128.
129.
130.

[d.
[d. at 1337-38.
[d. at 1338.
[d. Unfortunately, the Vances were ultimately denied an attorney's fee

award because they did not meet the Buckhannon prevailing party guidelines. The
court summarized its findings with respect to the Buckhannon issue:
[T]he Court finds that the [administrative law judge's] determination did not
bestow prevailing party status on Plaintiffs because it did not alter the legal
relationship between the parties. Moreover, Plaintiffs may not recover based
on the catalyst theory after Buckhannon. Finally, Defendants' payment to
Plaintiffs was a voluntary settlement made without judicial imprimatur and so
cannot support prevailing party status. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not entitled
to attorney's fees and costs as a matter of law.
[d. at 1343.
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awards to parent-attorneys.l31 The analysis will also examine the
differences between the situations giving rise to the IDEA cases
discussed above132 and the Kay decision. The analysis will then in
clude an examination of the plain language of the statute, which
appears to allow recovery, and view it in the context of the legisla
tive history and overall purpose of the IDEA. It will then look to
factors beyond statutory language and precedent, namely economic
and practical concerns, much like the Matthew V. court did.133 Fi
nally, the analysis will conclude that the totality of the foregoing
circumstances-the statutory language, the inapplicability of Kay,
and economic concerns-mandates a finding that parent-attorneys
recover their attorneys' fees.
A.

Kay v. Ehrler Should Not Apply to IDEA Cases

Every IDEA fee-shifting case that has been decided on this
issue has included a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's de
cision in Kay.134 These cases can be divided into two groups: the
early cases, which ruled that Kay applied because parent-attorneys
were proceeding pro se when representing their disabled chil
dren,135 and the later cases (after 1998), which held that even
though parent-attorneys are not proceeding pro se, the situation is
close enough to pro se representation that Kay should still apply,136
There are three fundamental reasons why Kay should not ap
ply to IDEA actions in the parent-attorney context and why the
holdings that denied fees are erroneous. First, when a parent brings
a claim that her child's right to a FAPE has been violated, she is not
acting pro se, as was the case with the attorney who represented
himself in Kay, but rather she is representing her child. Second,
parent-attorney representation does not carry with it the same con
131. See Ford v. Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2006); S.N. v.
Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of
Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260,
263 (4th Cir. 1998); Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 612 (D. Md. 1993); Miller v.
W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905, 906-07 (Ind. 1996).
132. See Ford, 461 F.3d at 1091; S.N., 448 F.3d at 604; Woodside, 248 F.3d at 131;
Doe, 165 F.3d at 263; Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1336; Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at
612; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 906-07.
133. See Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1337-38.
134. See Ford, 461 F.3d at 1091; S.N., 448 F.3d at 604; Woodside, 248 F.3d at 131;
Doe, 165 F.3d at 263; Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1336; Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at
612; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 906-07.
135. See Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 612; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 907.
136. See Ford, 461 F.3d at 1091; s.N., 448 F.3d at 604; Woodside, 248 F.3d at 131;
Doe, 165 F.3d at 263.
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cerns about insufficient representation as the type of representation
involved in Kay. Finally, after the 1997 amendments to the IDEA,
the statutory fee-shifting language is no longer similar to that of
§ 1988(b) or other civil rights statutes, and should be interpreted
independently. In fact, Kay has no applicability to the IDEA fee
shifting situation and should not be applied as a bar to recovery of
attorneys' fees for parent-attorneys.
1.

Parents and Disabled Children are Separate Legal
Entities Under the IDEA

The early cases, Miller and Rappaport, denied fees based on
the theory that parent-attorneys were proceeding pro se, like the
attorney in Kay, and, therefore, Kay barred an award.137 However,
the statutory rights given to parents and disabled children under the
IDEA are separate and distinct rights.1 38 While parents enjoy lim
ited procedural rights in certain contexts, the disabled child's right
is substantive in nature. Because of this dichotomy, it is logically
impossible for a parent to act pro se when challenging the denial of
a FAPE-a substantive right that belongs only to the child.139
Therefore, the prototypical situation present in the IDEA cases is
not analogous to that in Kay, and the holding of that case should
not apply to the parent-attorney scenario.
There can be no doubt that parents possess a number of rights
under the IDEA.140 One such right is the right to sue if the parent
qualifies as a "party aggrieved."141 Yet, the rights that parents pos
sess are only procedural and are separate and distinct from the sub
stantive rights of their disabled children.
The IDEA specifically sets out the procedural rights of a par
ent. For example, under §§ 1414 and 1415, parents have a variety of
137. Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 611-12 (citing Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435-37
(1991»; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 906 (citing Kay, 499 U.S. at 435-37).
138. See Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994,2002 (2007) (stating
that the rights of parents and their disabled children under the IDEA are separate
rights); Emery v. Roanoke City Sch. Bd., 432 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that
the "real party in interest" is the child who suffers the "core-injury," not the parent);
Doe, 165 F.3d at 262-63 (stating that the focus of the IDEA is on the child and not the
parent); Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1337 (stating that parents and their disabled
children are separate legal entities under the IDEA).
139. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2010 (Scalia, J., concurring). Recall also that some
of the courts that decided the parent-attorney fee award question also held that the
rights of the parent and the disabled child were distinct. See, e.g., Doe, 165 F.3d at 262
63.
140. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2002.
141. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2000).
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rights in the development and maintenance of their disabled child's
IEP.1 42 The Supreme Court recognized some of these rights in
Winkelman-for example, the right to have an active role in devel
oping and maintaining their child's IEP, the right to be part of all
decision-making processes, and the right to have access to their
child's educational records,l43 Parents have a long list of procedu
ral rights upon which they could sue if they were denied the right of
involvement in their child's IEP and if they were a "party ag
grieved" under the statute. 144
However, the right to a FAPE clearly belongs to the disabled
child and not the parent. The explicit overall purpose of the IDEA
is "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to
them a free appropriate public education ...."145 As Justice Scalia
aptly noted in his Winkelman concurrence, "[t]he parents of a dis
abled child no doubt have an interest in seeing their child receive a
proper education. But there is a difference between an interest and
a statutory right. The text of the IDEA makes clear that parents
have no right to the education itself."146 Since the claims in Ford,
s.N., Matthew V., Woodside, Doe, Miller, and Rappaport chal
lenged the functionality of the disabled child's IEP, and therefore
whether the child was receiving a FAPE,147 the legal claims were
based on the substantive rights of the child, not any right possessed
by the parents. Thus, the parent-attorneys were not acting pro se,
and they were not suing as "parties aggrieved" under the IDEA.148
Rather, they were serving as counsel for their disabled children.1 49
142. See, e.g., id. § 1414(d)(I)(B)(i) (parents must be members of their child's
IEP team); id. § 1415(b)(I) (parents must have an opportunity to examine records and
participate in IEP meetings); id. § 1415(b)(6)-(8) (parents may file administrative due
process complaints in subsequent administrative challenges).
143. See Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2000 (listing the statute's provisions and the
rights guaranteed by them).
144. See id. at 2008 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Because the rights to ... the various
procedural protections are accorded to parents themselves, they are 'parties aggrieved'
when those rights are infringed, and may accordingly proceed pro se when seeking to
vindicate them.").
145. 20 U.S.c. § 1400(d)(I)(A).
146. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2008 (Scalia, J., concurring).
147. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist, 461 F.3d 1087, 1088-89 (9th Cir.
2006); S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601, 602 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v.
Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ.,
165 F.3d 260, 261 (4th Cir. 1998); Matthew V. v. DeKalb County. Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp.
2d 1331, 1333-34 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Miller v. W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d
905, 906 (Ind. 1996); Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 610 (D. Md. 1993).
148. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2007-11 (Scalia, J., concurring).
149. Id.
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The majority of courts since 1998 have, in fact, found that par
ent-attorneys were not acting pro se when representing their dis
abled children when challenging the adequacy of an IEP.150 As one
district court put it, "no precedent known to the court has held that
a lawyer who represents his child is acting pro se."1S1 This distin
guishes the parent-attorney cases from the legal relationship that
was in place in Kay.
In Kay, the petitioner sued for a fee award based on the suc
cessful litigation of a violation of his own civil rights.t 52 The legal
claim arose out of the violation of the petitioner's substantive
rights, and there was no question that the attorney was representing
himself.1 53 In the IDEA cases, the basis for the legal claim does not
arise from a violation of the parent-attorney's substantive rights
under the IDEA, but rather from a violation of her disabled child's
substantive right to a FAPE.1 54 Thus, from a legal standpoint, the
representation involved in Kay and the IDEA cases are dissimilar.
Parent-attorneys are not proceeding pro se in IDEA cases, and
MiLLer and Rappaport's reliance on Kay was misplaced.
2.

Parent-Attorney Representation in IDEA Cases Does
Not Warrant the Same Concerns About
Inadequate Representation as Were
Present in Kay

The later cases that denied fees-Doe, Woodside, S.N., and
Ford-did not base their decisions on a pro se rationale. Instead,
they reasoned that parent-attorney representation of a disabled
child in an IDEA claim embodies the same dangers as the pro se
representation in Kay, and thus, should be treated similarly.155
Specifically, these courts were concerned that emotion, rather than
reason, would control the conduct of parent-attorneys who were
150. See, e.g., Doe, 165 F.3d at 262-63 (holding that parent-attorneys are not act
ing pro se). Of all the cases discussed in Part II of this Note, only Rappaport and Miller
held that the parent-attomies were actually acting pro se when representing their dis
abled children in this context. See Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 611-12; Miller, 665
N.E.2d at 906; supra notes 89-125 and accompanying text.
151. McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 976 F. Supp. 53, 65 (D. Mass. 1997).
152. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 433-34 (1991).
153. See id. at 435.
154. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
155. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir.
2006); S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v.
Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ.,
165 F.3d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1998).
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representing their children, and that this could be avoided by ob
taining independent counsel. 156
This argument does not take into account the professional
rules of conduct of every state that provide for situations just like
this, namely, when there is a danger that representation may be in
adequate due to a lawyer's personal interests and emotional attach
ment to a case. 157 The penalties for disobeying these rules are
sufficient to meet the concern that parent-attorneys will not ade
quately represent their "c1ients."158 These rules are set up in order
to regulate conduct among members of the legal profession. It is
not the role of the judiciary to step in and add additional limitations
on representation. Otherwise, courts could limit who could appear
before them in any given context.
Ironically, these same courts that voiced concerns over
whether a parent-attorney's representation was independent and
dispassionate enough to be competent went on to find that the par
ent-attorneys did, in fact, do a competent and professional job. 159
Thus, not only are the concerns over inadequate representation ad
equately checked by local rules of conduct, but they are also ne
gated by the factual circumstances surrounding the various cases.
While this does not guarantee that future parent-attorneys will be
156. Doe, 165 F.3d at 263; see also Ford, 461 F.3d at 1091 ("[A] disabled child
represented by his or her parent does not benefit from the judgment of an independent
third party."); S.N., 448 F.3d at 603 ("[A] parent-attorney representing his child 'is de
prived of the judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory of the case,
... formulating legal arguments, and in making sure that reason, rather than emotion,'
informs his tactical decisions." (quoting Kay, 499 U.S. at 437»; Woodside, 248 F.3d at
131 ("[T]he danger of inadequate representation is as great when an emotionally
charged parent represents his minor child as when the parent represents himself.").
157. See, e.g., MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.1 (2008), available at http://
www.mass.gov/obcbbo/RPC.pdf ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to
a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness,
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."); id. at R. 1.7(b) ("A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially
limited ... by the lawyer's own interests.").
158. See Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1338. The Professional Rules of Conduct
in most states provide for disbarment, reprimand (both public and private), and suspen
sion as discipline for violations.
159. E.g., Ford, 461 F.3d at 1091 (noting that the parent-attorney" 'obviously
handled h[er] professional responsibilities in this case in a competent manner.'" (quot
ing Kay, 499 U.S. at 435»; Doe, 165 F.3d at 263 ("Mr. Doe obtained an excellent result
for Tom ... and ... we do not in any way denigrate his care and effort in representing
his son ...."); see also Amy M. v. Timberlane Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 99-269-B, 2000
WL 1513769, at "'5 (D.N.H. Aug. 11, 2000) ("[T]he School District has pointed to noth
ing that suggests Chase [the relative-attorney] lacked the necessary independence to
represent Amy's interests ....").
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equally as successful or competent, it demonstrates that bright-line
bars on recovery based on the possibility of inadequate representa
tion are not based on the factual history of the cases. Rather, they
are based on paternalistic concerns about hypothetical conduct.
Parent-attorneys are not acting pro se when they represent
their disabled children. Concerns about inadequate representation
based on a lack of independent judgment are adequately checked
by professional rules of conduct. Given this, the comparison be
tween pro se representation in the parent-attorney IDEA context
and pro se representation in Kay is simply improper.
3.

The IDEA's Fee-Shifting Provision Differs from the
Provision Interpreted in Kay

In addition to the fact that a parent-attorney is not acting pro
se when representing her disabled child, the statute at issue in Kay
is fundamentally different from the IDEA's current fee-shifting
provision. Kay interpreted 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b),160 a statute whose
resemblance to the IDEA has diminished over time due to the sub
sequent amendments to each.
When Kay was decided in 1991, the language of § 1988(b) was
still the same as it had been when it was enacted as part of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. 161 The statute read,
"in any civil action or proceeding ... the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a rea
sonable attorney's fee as part of the costS."162 This language is simi
lar to the IDEA's fee-shifting language prior to the 1997
amendments, which read, "[i]n any action or proceeding brought
under this subsection, the court, in its discretion, may award reason
able attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents or guardian of
a handicapped child or youth who is the prevailing party."163 The
Supreme Court declared in 1989 that the "'fee-shifting statutes'
similar language is 'a strong indication' that they are to be inter
preted alike."164 Thus, it appears that at least those cases decided
before the 1997 amendments to the IDEA-Rappaport and
160. Kay, 499 U.S. at 433.
161. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90
Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b)).
162. Id.
163. Handicapped Children'S Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 2, 100
Stat. 796, 796 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. §§ 1440-45).
164. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989)
(quoting Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)).
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Miller-correctly interpreted the IDEA's fee-shifting language as
parallel to that of § 1988.165 Interestingly, however, the same year
that Kay was decided, a district court interpreting the IDEA noted
that "plaintiffs' motion for fees is based on the ERA, a different
statutory scheme from that which formed the basis of the Kay v.
Ehrler decision."166 Clearly, the two statutes were sufficiently dif
ferent to warrant distinct interpretations by at least one court. 167
In 1997, the IDEA's fee-shifting statute was amended and a
series of exceptions were added to bar or reduce the award of attor
neys' fees in certain circumstances. 168 By the time the first federal
appellate court examined the parent-attorney fee award issue under
the IDEA, the statute that had been interpreted in Kay and the
new incarnation of the IDEA's fee-shifting provision had little in
common,169 beyond the template language granting the court dis
165. However, these cases would still have to account for the fact that the real
party at interest is the child, not the parent, and thus the parents were not acting pro se
like the plaintiff in Kay.
166. Kattan v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 88-0630, 1991 WL 222312, at *1 (D.D.C.
Oct. 17, 1991), affd, 995 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
167. In 1996, § 1988(b) was amended under the Federal Courts Improvement
Act. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847
(codified at 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b». An exception was added that barred a fee award in
actions against judicial officers acting in their official capacity. See 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b).
This exception, which is still in effect in the current version of the law, is not present in
the IDEA's fee-shifting statute, thus differentiating the two even further. See id.
168. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified at 20 U.S.c. § 1400); supra note 39.
169. Read together the two statutes are strikingly dissimilar. Currently, § 1988(b)
states that:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision ... of this title, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, except that in any ac
tion brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs,
including attorney's fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such of
ficer's jurisdiction.
42 U.S.c. § 1988(b). On the other hand, § 1415(i)(3)(B), (D)-(E) states that:
(B) Award of attorneys' fees
In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its
discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the
parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party.
(D) Prohibition of attorneys' fees and related costs for certain services
(i) Attorneys' fees may not be awarded and related costs may not be re
imbursed in any action or proceeding under this section for services performed
subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent if
(I) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, at any
time more than 10 days before the proceeding begins;
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cretion to award reasonable feesPo Certainly by 1997, the two stat
utes had drastically evolved from what they were when first enacted
in 1976 and 1986, respectively, which only provides stronger evi
dence that Kay should not be applied in the IDEA context, espe
cially when combined with the fact that parent-attorneys are not
proceeding pro se, and thus any concerns over inadequate represen
tation are unwarranted. l71
B.

The Plain Language of the Statute and Its Legislative History
Demonstrate Congress's Intent to Allow Parent-Attorneys
to Recover Their Attorneys' Fees

Since Kay should not apply to IDEA cases, it becomes neces
sary to discuss how the IDEA's fee-shifting provision should be in
terpreted and why the prior interpretations by courts were
incorrect. When interpreting any statute, the Supreme Court has
stated: "[w]e begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction
that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of
the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to
the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclu
sive."I72 Therefore, the starting point for the examination of the
IDEA's fee-shifting provision must be the language of the statute
itself.

(II) the offer is not accepted within 10 days; and
(III) the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief finally
obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of
settlement.
(ii) Attorneys' fees may not be awarded relating to any meeting of the
IEP Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative
proceeding or judicial action, or, at the discretion of the State, for a mediation
described in subsection (e) of this section ....
(E) Exception to prohibition on attorneys' fees and related costs
Notwithstanding subparagraph (D), an award of attorneys' fees and re
lated costs may be made to a parent who is the prevailing party and who was
substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer.
20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B), (D)-(E) (2000).
170. See 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B); 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b). Yet, if this standard
threshold language were the only measuring stone, many statutes that authorize recov
ery of attorneys' fees would have to be interpreted in concert.
171. See supra Parts III.A.1-2.
172. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980).
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The Plain Language of the Statute Allows Parent
Attorneys to Recover

Given the Supreme Court's instruction,173 most courts that
have decided against awarding parent-attorneys their attorneys'
fees curiously gave little credence to the specific language of the
IDEA's fee-shifting provision. 174 Under that provision of the
IDEA, a court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys'
fees to parents who are prevailing parties. 175 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit was the only court who denied a fee award
despite analyzing the plain language of the statute. 176 None of the
other courts that denied fees examined the plain language at all. l77
According to the plain language, if the court finds that giving
an award is within its discretion, it can award fees to a prevailing
party who is the parent of a disabled child. 178 Certainly, all of the
parents who petitioned the court for fee awards in the cases ex
amined were parents of a disabled child. Thus, the only reasons for
denying an award would be if the parents were not "prevailing par
ties," or if the statutory exceptions to a fee award applied. 179 De
pending on the outcome, there may be some question as to whether
the parent-attorneys in any given case actually meet the definition
of "prevailing party" under Buckhannon.1 80 However, that should
not serve as a complete bar to the ability of all parent-attorneys to
173. See id.
174. See S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601, 603 (2d Cir. 2006) (dis
cussing only the plain language of the statute in comparison to § 1988 in deciding
whether or not to apply Kay); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d
129, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting the language of 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B), yet with
out discussing it, basing its decision entirely upon Doe); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d
260,261-62 (4th Cir. 1998) (disregarding the Does' contention that the plain language
allows fees); Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 611-12 (D. Md. 1993) (ignoring the
statutory language completely and looking to whether the provision should be inter
preted in consonance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Miller v. W. Lafay
ette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905, 906-07 (Ind. 1996) (disregarding the meaning of
the IDEA's fee-shifting language and instead likening its language to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and applying Kay).
175. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
176. Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2006)
(The Ford court observed that, "applying the plain meaning of the provision, the Fords
appear to be entitled to fees. ").
177. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (explaining where the courts that
denied fees began their analyses).
178. See 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
179. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text for a list of the statutory excep
tions, none of which apply in any of the cases examined.
180. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

2009]

THE IDEA OF FAIRNESS

231

recover. 181 Since the parent-attorneys were not barred from recov
ery by any of the statutory exceptions, the basis of denial had to be
due to the fact that the parents of the disabled child were also attor
neys. Indeed, the court in Amy M. v. Timberlane Regional School
District acknowledged that, "[t]he only limitation that the IDEA
imposes on the recovery of attorney's fees by a prevailing party re
late to the circumstances under which the fees were incurred, [not]
the status of the person who incurred the fees. "182
2.

The IDEA's Fee-Shifting Statute Already Contains
Circumstances in Which Parents are Excluded
from Recovery of Fees.

The attorney's fees provision of the IDEA includes express ex
ceptions.1 83 Given that parent-attorneys are not barred from recov
ery except under the exceptions, it can be inferred that Congress
did not intend to bar their recovery except within those exceptions.
Moreover, § 1415(i)(3)(E) even provides an exception to the excep
tion, demonstrating that Congress had thoroughly considered all of
the potential consequences of adopting the language barring a fee
award in certain circumstances. l84 Therefore, in determining how
to interpret the language of § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(E), the doctrine of ex
pressio unius est exclusio alterius applies and "instructs that when
certain matters are mentioned ... other similar matters not men
tioned were intended to be excluded. "185
Since there is already language that bars a fee award in certain
circumstances it is a reasonable assumption that Congress intended
these to be the only circumstances in which fees should be barred.
Indeed, the court in Matthew V. correctly noted, "[i]f Congress had
wished to preclude the award of fees in these [the parent-attorney
situation] circumstances, it would have said so in its list of other
181. See, e.g., Matthew V. v. Dekalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1338
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (where the parents were deemed able to recover a fee award but were
denied because they did not have "prevailing party" status under Buckhannon).
182. Amy M. v. Timberlane Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 99-269-B, 2000 WL
1513769, at *4 (D.N.H. Aug. 11, 2000).
183. See supra note 169, which recites the language of 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(D).
184. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(E) (2000) ("Notwithstanding subparagraph (D), an
award of attorneys' fees and related costs may be made to a parent who is the prevailing
party and who was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer.").
185. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 150 Pension Fund v. Vertex Constr. Co.,
Inc., 932 F.2d 1443, 1449 (11th Cir. 1991); see also RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON
JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT
78-81 (2002) (discussing the phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning that
the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others).
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exclusions."186 Thus, both the plain language of § 1415(i)(3)(B)
and an interpretation of the sections immediately following and
pertaining directly to it, suggest parent-attorneys should be allowed
to recover.
3.

a.

The Legislative History Supports the Position That
Parent-Attorneys Should be Allowed to Recover
Their Attorneys' Fees

The Handicapped Children's Protection Act and its Legislative
History

There has been no substantial discussion of the plain meaning
of the IDEA's fee-shifting provision in any of the cases examined,
and courts have differed considerably in their rationale for denying
fee awards.1 87 Equally true is the fact that the provision has been
interpreted to allow parents who hire independent attorneys to re
cover their fees. 188 Thus, the IDEA's fee-shifting provision is open
to various interpretations depending on the occupation of the par
ent bringing the action on behalf of her child. When a statute is
subject to multiple interpretations, the intent of the legislature may
be considered in order to ascertain the proper interpretation. 189
The intent of the legislature can be inferred from the legislative his
tory surrounding the adoption of the law. 190 Thus, the place to be
gin when looking at the legislative history of the IDEA's fee
shifting provision is the adoption of the HCPA in 1986, which for
the first time provided prevailing parents of disabled children with a
vehicle for financing expensive litigation costS.191
The primary purpose of the HCPA was to overturn the Su
preme Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson, which barred recov

186. Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. at 1337.
187. Compare Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609,612 (D. Md. 1993) (denying
an award because the parent-attorney was proceeding pro se and because the IDEA's
fee-shifting provision was akin to Title VII's), with Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260,
263 (4th Cir. 1998) (denying fees due to an alleged similarity to the type of representa
tion involved in Kay).
188. See, e.g., A.R. ex reI. R.V. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 75 (2d
Cir. 2005) ("[T]he parties agree, as do we, that a plaintiff who receives IHO-ordered
relief on the merits in an IDEA administrative proceeding is a 'prevailing party.' He or
she may therefore be entitled to payment of attorneys' fees under the IDEA's fee
shifting provisions. ").
189. See Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statu
tory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 10 (2003).
190. See id.
191. See Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372,
§ 2(B), 100 Stat. 796, 796 (codified at 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000)).
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ery of attorneys' fees by a parent under the EAHCA.192 A
secondary purpose was to require parents to exhaust their remedies
under the statute before instituting litigation or trying to recover
their fees under another statute.1 93 The specific language adopted
for the fee-shifting provision intentionally paralleled the language
of other civil rights statutes. 194 In the congressional debates over
the bill, Representative Williams from Montana stated, "[t]his bill
provides to handicapped children and their parents the same rights,
no more, no less, that are provided to all other groups under the
other Civil Rights Acts of the United States."195 Similarly, Repre
sentative Biaggi from New York stated, "[t]he whole purpose of at
torney's fees provisions is to help equalize the balance of power and
192. S. REP. No. 99-112, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1799.
The committee report indicated that "Congress' original intent was that due process
procedures, including the right to litigation if that became necessary, be available to all
parents." It went on to say:
The situation which has resulted from the Smith v. Robinson decision was
.summarized by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in their dissenting
opinion: "Congress will now have to take the time to revisit the matter."
Seeking to clarify the intent of Congress with respect to the educational rights
of handicapped children guaranteed by the EHA, the Handicapped Children's
Protection Act of 1985 was introduced ....
[d.; see also 131 CONGo REC. 31,370 (1985) (statement of Rep. Williams) ("The original
bill was designed to accomplish four basic objectives .... Second, to reestablish statu
tory rights repealed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the decision in [Smith v. Robin
son)."). The Court held in Smith that the EAHCA, with its lack of a fee-shifting
provision, was the exclusive avenue through which claims could be pursued. Parents
were thus not able to recover attorneys' fees in actions under that statute. See Smith V.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1021 (1984); see supra notes 23-41 for a discussion of Smith.
193. S. REp. No. 99-112, at 15. The committee report stated:
[N]othing i[n] S. 415 should be interpreted to allow parents to circumvent the
due process procedures and protections created under the EHA. For exam
ple, under the EHA parents must generally exhaust administrative remedies
to attempt to resolve certain disagreements before filing a civil court action.
Section 3 makes it clear that when parents choose to file suit under another
law that protects the rights of handicapped children (e.g., section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act), if that suit could have been filed under the EHA, then
parents are required to exhaust EHA administrative remedies to the same
extent as would have been necessary if the suit had been filed under the EHA.
[d. The reference to "S. 415" in the Senate Report was to the version of the HCPA that
the Senate reviewed.
194. See id. at 14. The report stated that "[t]he committee also intends that sec
tion 2," the fee-shifting provision, "should be interpreted consistent with fee provisions
of statutes such as title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ...." [d.
195. 131 CONGo REC. 31,377 (statement of Rep. Williams). Thus, it seems that the
court in Rappaport v. Vance (a case decided before the 1997 IDEA amendments) was
correct in examining how Title VII had been construed and stating, "[i]f the rules re
garding Title VII attorney's fees are strictly applied to IDEA, Plaintiff cannot recover
fees as a pro se litigant." Rappaport V. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Md. 1993).
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to enable those protected by civil rights statutes to pursue the pro
cedures established by Congress."196
However, a closer inspection of the legislative history sur
rounding the HCPA's adoption in 1986 also illuminates another
congressional purpose: to encourage parents to exercise their right
to be involved in the educational planning for their handicapped
child. 197 The Senate Report acknowledged this point, concluding
that parents needed to have available to them all possible remedies
to advance their disabled child's rights. 198 Further, as Representa
tive Biaggi pointed out:
There can be no doubt that an attorney's fee provision for
the EHA which reimburses prevailing parents for fees incurred
in the administrative as well as judicial proceedings will be a criti
cal tool for ... parents seeking to secure Congress' guarantee of
an appropriate education for their children. 199

Moreover, Representative Miller of California expressed the
need for convenience in order to foster greater parental advocacy:
[W]ithout parental advocacy on behalf of handicapped children,
these children's access to a free appropriate public education will
be further jeopardized .
. . . Neither I nor others who wrote the law intended that
parents should be forced to expend valuable time and money ...
to gain for their children an education which meets their individ
ual needs. 2OO

Thus, while in 1986 Congress definitely intended for the
IDEA's fee-shifting language to parallel that of other civil rights
statutes, there was another important interest in the balance-ad
vancing the right of parents to undertake litigation to further their
child's substantive right to a free appropriate public education.
What is clear is that parent-attorneys, as parents of disabled
children, should be treated no differently than nonattorney parents.
Congress's aim of easing the ability of parents to advocate on be
half of their children applies equally to them. Examining the legis
lative history of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA will help
196. 131 CONGo REC. 31,375 (statement of Rep. Biaggi).
197. See id. at 31,376 (statement of Rep. Miller) ("Parents' involvement in the
education of their handicapped child is not only essential to the task, it is a right specifi
cally included in the law.").
198. S. REP. No. 99-112, at 17.
199. 131 CONGo REC. 31,375 (statement of Rep. Biaggi).
200. Id. at 31,376 (statement of Rep. Miller).
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elucidate the confusion created by these two Congressional inten
tions and their relation to parent-attorneys.

b.

The Legislative History of the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA

In 1997, Congress enacted many alterations to the IDEA, in
cluding a change to the language of the fee-shifting provision that
added certain limitations to parental recovery of attorneys' fees. 201
The purpose of adding these limitations, and the exception to the'
exception under § 1415(i)(3)(E), was to foster greater parental in
volvement in all stages of the process. 202 This goal is consistent
with the statements of Representatives Biaggi and Miller in ex
plaining the purpose of the adoption of the fee-shifting provision in
1986.203
Congress also recognized that one of the goals of the HCPA's
initial fee-shifting provision was to mirror the language of other
civil rights statutes. 204 As Senator Harkin from Iowa correctly
noted, any departure from the original language would alter the
similarity between the IDEA's fee-shifting language and that of the
civil rights statutes it was modeled after:
[Senator Hatch, the bill's author,] modeled the IDEA fees provi
sions on provisions in other civil rights laws. On final passage of
these provisions he explained that they reflected a carefully
crafted compromise that provides for reasonable attorneys fees
to a prevailing parent while at the same time protecting against
excessive reimbursement.

201. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-17, § 615, 111 Stat. 37, 92 (codified at 20 U.S.c. § 1415).
202. See S. REP. No. 105-17, at 5 (1997) stating, "[t]his authorization is viewed by

the committee as an opportunity to review, strengthen, and improve IDEA to better
educate children with disabilities and enable them to achieve a quality education by ...
[s]trengthening the role of parents ...." The Senate Report further stated:
The committee believes that the IEP process should be devoted to deter
mining the needs of the child and planning for the child's education with par
ents and school personnel. To that end, the bill specifically excludes the
payment of attorneys' fees for attorney participation in IEP meetings, unless
such meetings are convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or
judicial action.
Id. at 25-26.
203. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
204. See 143 CONGo REc. 8181 (1997) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
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Let's not upset that carefully crafted compromise. Let's re
tain the parity between the fees provisions in the IDEA with the
fees provisions in other civil rights statutes. 205

However, Senator Harkin's point of view was rejected by Con
gress when it enacted the alterations to the fee-shifting provision
and departed from the original language of the HCPA.206 Since the
IDEA's original language was modeled on existing civil rights stat
utes, any departure from that language must be seen as congres
sional intent to depart from the parallels between the IDEA's fee
shifting provision and those upon which it was modeled.
This presents an interesting dichotomy. Because they were de
cided before the 1997 amendments were adopted, the Rappaport
and Miller decisions were correct at that time in interpreting the
IDEA consistently with other similarly worded civil rights stat
utes. 207 However, the decisions since the 1997 amendment have not
taken note of the consequences of Congress's alterations to the
IDEA's fee-shifting language. 208 Instead, those decisions relied
solely on comparing the IDEA cases to Kay, based on the pro se
representation analysis and the misplaced concerns that it embod
ies. 209 Yet, in the parent-attorney IDEA cases, those concerns are
without merit,2l0 Thus, only the court in Matthew V. correctly in
terpreted the IDEA's fee-shifting provision.

205. Id. Senator Harkin was arguing against an amendment to the fee-shifting
language already in existence. "I rise in strong opposition to the ... amendment which
adds limitations on the awarding of attorneys fees to parents of disabled children that
are unprecedented in any other fees provision." Id.
206. See 20 U.S.c. § 1415(i)(3)(D)-(E) (2000)).
207. Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 611-12 (D. Md. 1993); Miller v. W.
Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905, 906-07 (Ind. 1996); see also S. REP. No. 99
112, at 14 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1804 ("The committee also
intends that section 2 [the fee-shifting provision] should be interpreted consistent with
fee provisions of statutes such as title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ...."). Where
Rappaport and Miller erred was in applying Kay because parent-attorneys are not pro
ceeding pro se.
208. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist, 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006);
S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601, 602 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. Sch.
Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d
260 (4th Cir. 1998).
209. See Ford, 461 F.3d at 1090-91; S.N., 448 F.3d at 603-05; Woodside, 248 F.3d at
131; Doe, 165 F.3d. at 261-63; Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 611-12; Miller, 665 N.E.2d at
906-07.
210. See supra Part IIl.A. for discussion of why Kay does not apply to IDEA
cases.
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Where the Matthew V. Court Went Right and Others Went
Wrong: Looking Beyond Kay and Outside the Box

The Matthew V. court was the only court to hold that parent
attorneys should be able to recover their attorneys' fees under the
IDEA's fee-shifting provision. 2lt The Matthew V. court supported
its conclusion with four main points.212 The first three are echoed
in the conclusions of this Note: parent-attorneys should be able to
recover their fees because (1) the statutory language does not pro
hibit these awards, (2) parents and their disabled children are sepa
rate legal entities under the IDEA, and (3) the professional rules of
conduct serve as a check on inadequate representation. 213 How
ever, where the Matthew V. court truly distanced itself from other
courts was by including practical, realistic, and economic concerns
in its considerations. 214
In addition to all that has been said about statutory language,
interpretation, and applicability of case law, there remains the im
portant concern that the purpose of enacting a fee-shifting provi
sion as part of the IDEA was to provide "a critical tool for ...
parents seeking to secure Congress' guarantee of an appropriate
education for their children."215 As such, there are basic considera
tions of economic and practical feasibility that must be considered
in litigating an IDEA claim, especially in light of the statute's over
all purpose.
The Matthew V. court was the only court to examine the eco
nomic strain put on parents in the process of litigating an IDEA
claim.
[A] brief economic analysis suggests that attorney's fees should
be available under these circumstances. Even though a parent
attorney may be his child's most valuable advocate as a parent, as
an attorney, the parent is subject to opportunity costs inherent in
performing legal work for her child rather than for a paying
client. 216
211. Matthew V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F.Supp. 2d 1331, 1337-38 (N.D.
Ga. 2003).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1338 (discussing the economic and time-management concerns sur
rounding the parent-attorney IDEA situation).
215. 131 CONGo REc. 31,375 (1985) (statement of Rep. Biaggi).
216. Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
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The court's observation is inherently true, as every hour a parent
attorney spends researching and litigating his disabled child's
IDEA claim is another hour not spent with a "paying client."217
A report conducted in 2003 by the Special Education Expendi
ture Project (SEEP) provided figures on the costs and the success
rate of parents litigating IDEA cases. 218 The study found that aver
age litigation expenses for an IDEA claim are approximately
$95,000.219 Litigation success rates for unrepresented parents
amounted to only forty-three percent. 220 Parents who were repre
sented by an attorney had an increase in their success rate of any
where from twenty to twenty-seven percent.221 While retaining an
attorney obviously helped parents and their disabled children in
prevailing in their IDEA claims, the financial burden of litigation
may be too much even for moderately wealthy families, not to men
tion for lower-or middle-class families.
Moreover, as an economic and practical concern, attorneys
may not be readily available given the amount of time and money
necessary to litigate an IDEA claim. 222 This was similar to the
problem faced by Michael McLaughlin in McLaughlin v. Boston
School Committee ,223 where the claim was based on racial discrimi
217. Id.
218. Daggett, supra note 37, at 25-26. The SEEP is part of the Center for Special
Education Finance (CSEF). See CSEF/SEEP: Center for Special Education Finance &
Special Education Expenditure Project, http://www.csef-air.org/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2009).
219. JAY G. CHAMBERS, JENIFER J. HARR, AMYNAH DHANANI, SPECIAL EDUC.
EXPENDITURE PROJECT, WHAT ARE WE SPENDING ON PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION, 1999-2000?, at 8, (2003) available at http://csef.air.org/publica
tions/seep/nationallProcedural %20Safeguards.PD F.
220. Daggett, supra note 37, at 26. These success rates include cases in which
parents only partially prevailed. Id. It should also be noted that in most of these cases,
the parents who represented their child were likely not attorneys. Had they not been
included, success rates would likely have been higher. Id.
221. See id. at 24.
222. See supra Part J.D. Recall the lengthy administrative process that must be
fulfilled before a claim can even get before a judge. Time and money spent may be
additionally increased because it often takes significant use of expert witnesses to actu
ally prove that the school district violated the child's substantive right to a FAPE. See
Crary, supra note 4, at 968. Crary suggests,
that the use of expert witnesses in these IDEA actions is both necessary and
costly. Before filing suit against a school district, special education attorneys
recommend that parents obtain "strong, believable" expert witness testimony,
because such testimony, often in the form of evaluations or other recommen
dations, is generally necessary to rebut a school district's assertion that a child
is receiving a "free appropriate public education."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
223. McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 976 F. Supp. 53 (D. Mass. 1997).
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nation. McLaughlin was forced to proceed himself when he could
find no attorney to litigate on behalf of his daughter. 224 And, like
the attorneys in Doe, Ford, and Amy M., McLaughlin obtained an
excellent result for his "client."225 In cases involving civil rights,
like McLaughlin and the IDEA cases, there are often many more
violations of children's rights than there are attorneys willing or
able to litigate to vindicate those rights. 226
Economically and practically, given the litigation costs and the
risk of losing the case, a parent-attorney may actually be discour
aged from taking an active role in the education of her child, partic
ularly if there is no compensation even with success. Such a result
is clearly contrary to the concern expressed by Congress in discuss
ing the adoption of the original fee-shifting provision: that disabled
children should be given the right to a FAPE, and their parents
should not be disadvantaged in ensuring that right.227
The policy of denying parent-attorneys their fees in successful
litigation of IDEA claims is nonsensical because the IDEA and its
fee-shifting provision were designed specifically to enhance the
rights of disabled children and involve their parents in the adminis
trative process. Yet, denying fees discourages those parent-attor
neys from being involved in their child's education and quite
possibly could detrimentally affect the child's access to a FAPE.
CONCLUSION: CONNECfING ALL THE PIECES

The parent-attorney who wishes to recover attorney's fees in
representation of her disabled child in an IDEA case has an ardu
ous task ahead of her. Only one district court has held that fees are
recoverable, while a host of courts at all levels have held that fees
may not be awarded. 228 What these parent-attorneys have on their
224. Id. at 65.
225. Id. ("But for his readiness to proceed personally, plaintiff's complaint might
never have been filed and her enrollment at BLS [Boston Latin School] never
achieved.").
226. See id.
227. See 131 CONGo REc. 31,376 (1985) (statement of Rep. Miller); supra note 199
and accompanying text.
228. See Matthew V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga.
2003) (the only case to hold that fees may be awarded). The courts that have denied
fees range from federal appellate courts to state supreme courts. See, e.g., Ford v. Long
Beach Unified Sch. Dist, 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006); S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch.
Dist., 448 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248
F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998); Rappaport v.
Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1993); Miller v. W. Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665
N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 1996).
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side is the simple fact that Congress clearly did not intend these
parents to expend vast sums of money and huge amounts of time
defending the rights of their disabled children without being com
pensated when they prevail.
The cases that denied fees were erroneously decided because
they relied primarily on comparing the situation in the IDEA cases
to Kay.229 There are significant differences between the factual sit
uations and the applicable statutes in Kay and the IDEA cases.
Specifically, parent-attorneys are not acting pro se when represent
ing their children because they are litigating a claim based on a vio
lation of their children's substantive rights, not any right they
themselves possess. Further, concerns over excessively attached or
emotional representation when parent-attorneys represent their
children are adequately checked by professional rules of conduct.
It is contrary to the purpose of the IDEA and basic notions of fair
ness to request that parent-attorneys, as part of the general parent
population, take an active role in educating their disabled child and
then require them to expend not only their own resources, but also
their time-time that could be used earning money from other cli
ents-representing their child.
Further, by examining the actual language of the statute, it be
comes clear that the IDEA does not prohibit a fee award to parent
attorneys. As the legislative history demonstrates, the IDEA's fee
shifting provision is completely different from the original language
of the HCPA. The 1997 amendments represent a break with the
original language enacted in the HCPA. Congress was aware of the
problem with this language, given that both Miller and Rappaport
had interpreted the provision to deny a fee award. 230 Congress
could have clarified its intent and added language to prohibit
awards to parent-attorneys, but it did not. This can only be seen as
an intention to allow the possibility of recovery to remain open to
parent-attorneys.
Perhaps the most important reason to allow parent-attorneys
to recover fees is, in the words of Representative Miller, that
"[p]arents' involvement in the education of their handicapped child
is not only essential to the task, it is a right specifically included in
229. See, e.g., Ford, 461 F.3d at 1090-91; S.N., 448 F.3d at 603-05; Woodside, 248
F.3d at 131; Doe, 165 F.3d. at 261-63; Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 611-12; Miller, 665
N.E.2d at 906-07.
230. Both cases were decided prior to 1997. See Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 609;
Miller, 665 N.E.2d at 905.
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the law."231 The IDEA's goals, disabled children, and their parents
would all be better served by applying the same general require
ments for recovery of attorneys' fees to parent-attorneys as to non
parent attorneys who are representing a disabled child. A parent
attorney should not be deprived of the statutory right to attorney's
fees simply because he is acting as both an attorney representing a
client and a parent trying his best to help his child.

Justin D. Kumpulanian

231.

131

CONGo

REc. 31,376 (statement of Rep. Miller).

